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ABSTRACT
The notion of a distinction between merely formal freedom and real,
substantive freedom is common in both philosophy and civil rhetoric. However, Ian
Carter contends that this distinction faces coherence and usefulness problems.
Contra Carter, I argue that it is coherent, meaningful, and clarifies significant
philosophical disagreements about the right to freedom. I define the formalsubstantive freedom distinction by outlining a non-univocal conception of each term,
then explain why the distinction so conceived is both philosophically and practically
significant. I review Carter’s arguments, extract two potential objections to my
account, and offer my replies.

INDEX WORDS: Freedom, Formal freedom, Substantive freedom, Ian Carter,
Liberalism, Rights

Copyright by
Jake Sweet
2022

An Explanation of the Formal-Substantive Freedom Distinction (and Why it
Matters)

by

Jake Sweet

Committee Chairs: S.M. Love
Andrew Jason Cohen

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
August 2022

iv
DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my loving family: my mother, my father, my brother,
my sister-in-law, and my four amazing nieces. They have supported and encouraged
me every step of the way, and they have my gratitude and love forever.

v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to acknowledge and thank my co-advisors, Dr. S.M. Love and Dr.
Andrew Jason Cohen. Without their guidance, this thesis would not have been
possible. I could not have asked for better mentors. I also wish to acknowledge Dr.
Christie Hartley, whose encouragement, advice, and instruction was invaluable. I
must also acknowledge the many excellent professors of philosophy I learned under
as an undergraduate at the University of Cincinnati, especially Dr. Lawrence Jost,
Dr. Vanessa Carbonell, Dr. Robert Skipper, and Dr. Timothy Allen.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... V
1

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 1

2

THE MEANING OF THE DISTINCTION..................................................... 3
2.1

Formal Freedom and Legal Permission ................................................. 3

2.2

Substantive Freedom and Exercisability .............................................. 7

2.2.1 Ability and Opportunity.......................................................................8
2.2.2 Self-direction .......................................................................................10
2.3
3

THE USEFULNESS OF THE DISTINCTION ........................................... 13
3.1

Philosophical Significance...................................................................... 13

3.2

Practical Significance .............................................................................. 17

4

5

Summary ..................................................................................................... 12

CARTER’S ARGUMENT AND TWO OBJECTIONS ................................ 18
4.1

Carter’s Argument..................................................................................... 19

4.2

The Relevance-to-Laissez-Faire Liberalism Objection ..................... 21

4.3

The Semantic Objection........................................................................... 25
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 26

WORKS CITED .......................................................................................................... 28

1
1 INTRODUCTION
In political discourse, people commonly draw a distinction between formal
and substantive freedom, where substantive freedom is understood as the 'true'
freedom in contrast to formal freedom, which is 'freedom in name only.' In
philosophy, the distinction is invoked to critique proposals, institutions, and
theories that are purported to make us free but fail to effectively do so for some set
of people. More importantly, activists and social movements have invoked the
formal-substantive freedom distinction throughout history, deploying it to draw
attention to areas where the real scope of freedom for oppressed or marginalized
groups is restricted despite their formal freedom. For instance, the Black
Convention Movement of the 19th century invoked the concept of formal freedom to
describe the state of civil liberties for Black Americans in the Northern ‘free’ states,
where they still faced structural obstacles to acting as free citizens despite the
abolition of legal slavery (Fox 319, 342-344). The socialist tradition has also long
made use of this distinction; for example, Rosa Luxemburg argued that socialists
have “always revealed the hard kernel of social inequality and lack of freedom
hidden under the sweet shell of formal equality and freedom – not in order to reject
the latter but to spur the working class into not being satisfied with the shell”
(Luxemburg 220). More recently, scholar and activist Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor
describes the struggle for racial justice for Black Americans thusly: “We talk about
wanting Black people to be free, so we have to think through what that means,
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which involves understanding what limits Black freedom and what Black freedom
— beyond statutory, formal freedom — could look like” (Taylor).
Despite the ubiquity of this distinction, some have suggested that it is
fundamentally, conceptually flawed. Most notably, Ian Carter has challenged
“socialist and egalitarian” thinkers who use the distinction in their arguments
(486), questioning its coherence and usefulness in “The Myth of ‘Merely Formal
Freedom.’” If Carter is correct, it would mean that the arguments of both the
philosophical views and social justice movements that use this distinction are
grounded in conceptual confusion.
In what follows, I argue that the formal-substantive freedom distinction is a
coherent, meaningful distinction that clarifies significant disagreements about
freedom. In section 1, I define the distinction and establish its coherence in a way
that accounts for differences in its usage. I argue that ‘formal freedom’ and
‘substantive freedom’ are non-univocal terms that refer to legal permission and
exercisability, respectively, then provide some examples of various senses the terms
can have within different contexts. In section 2, I argue that the distinction is useful
both philosophically and practically. Philosophically, I suggest the distinction
clarifies points of divergence in our evaluations of political policy proposals and
philosophical views as they relate to freedom. Practically, I note the usefulness of
the distinction in explaining and justifying the demands of oppressed people for
greater freedom. In section 3, I reply to some of Carter’s main criticisms of the
formal-substantive freedom distinction. I begin by reviewing Carter’s arguments.
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Despite substantial differences between his conception of the distinction and mine, I
extract from his arguments two objections that might still be raised against my
account and contend that my account survives both.
In this paper, I am restricting my arguments to defending the formalsubstantive freedom distinction from that it lacks meaningfulness, usefulness, or
relevance to philosophical differences. I am not defending any particular view of
what kinds of rights to freedom we do or ought to have.
2

THE MEANING OF THE DISTINCTION

In this section, I give a conceptual account of formal and substantive freedom
and explain how these concepts can be distinguished. This section aims to establish
the distinction’s meaning and coherence in a way that simultaneously accounts for
different usages of the terms while still maintaining the distinction’s conceptual
core.
2.1 Formal Freedom and Legal Permission
‘Formal freedom’ is best understood as having multiple meanings, all of them
referring in some way to legal permission.1 While various definitions of ‘legal
permission’ have been proposed in the philosophical literature,2 here, ‘legal
permission’ simply refers to bilateral non-prohibition by the state, meaning the
state neither forbids (nor commands) an individual to perform a given action.
We can distinguish two main categories of legal permission to which ‘formal

1
2

For a slightly different view of formal freedom-as-legal permission, see: Van Parijs 4; 22-23.
For a few examples, see: Von Wright 85-92; Moore; Eleftheriadis 86-106; Ross; 120-124.
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freedom’ typically refers. This distinction hinges on whether an enacted legal
permission is, in fact, respected and protected by the state or not. That is, ‘formal
freedom’ may refer to nominal legal permission – legal permission that is not
respected or upheld – or actual legal permission – legal permission that is generally
respected or upheld.
Where formal freedom refers to nominal legal permission, it means that one
has legal permission to Φ according to the law, yet nonetheless systematically
suffers from interference by (state or non-state) actors or a failure of the
government to enforce the claims and protections necessary for the law’s
effectiveness. This sort of legal permission is sometimes called a ‘right in name
only.’ Conversely, formal freedom qua actual legal permission consists of legal
permissions that the state does respect and uphold, yet where people still in some
way lack the means to carry out those permitted acts.
I postulate that, depending on context, ‘formal freedom’ may refer to either
kind.3 We can infer which sense of ‘formal freedom’ is being used from the context of
utterance.4 For example, consider this statement:
In significant areas – speech, press, religion – the people only had
formal freedom.
Imagine this is said during a discussion about Soviet history between well-informed

Carter, by contrast, presents these two kinds of legal permission as mutually exclusive
conceptions of formal freedom (487-489).
4 The presupposition that ‘formal freedom’ must have a single meaning is an apparent
example of what Dirk Geeraerts calls the monosemic bias: the assumption that terms must be
interpreted as having one meaning rather than multiple meanings (Geeraerts 149-150). This can
have a deleterious effect on conceptual analysis, as it lends itself to ignoratio elenchi (and,
ultimately, confusion) rather than a clarification of meanings.
3
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people about the history of human rights under the Stalinist regime. According to
its constitution of 1936, the U.S.S.R. protected these civil liberties, but the
purported liberties were not reliably respected in practice. The state routinely
practiced censorship and control within these domains and, hence, these rights were
extant in name only.5 Accordingly, we can translate this statement as follows:
In significant areas – speech, press, religion – the people only had
formal freedom [in the sense of nominal legal permission].
There are many similar situations where the state constructs or allows
obstacles that frustrate agents’ attempt to do what they are nominally permitted to
do. Various thinkers and activists have referred to such conditions as “merely
formal freedom.” For instance, the concept has been invoked to describe laws that
make procuring an abortion difficult, as when the United States Supreme Court
argued that restrictions on the availability of abortion can constitute an “undue
burden” on the right to an abortion, effectively making it a right in name only, and
therefore ruled that such restrictions must be removed (Persad 296; Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey). This sort of usage of the term
‘formal freedom’ refers to nominal legal permission.
In contrast, consider this statement:
You have only the formal freedom to buy housing.
Imagine this is said in the context of a discussion between Americans about rights
in the contemporary United States. Americans not only have the legal permission to

5

Towe.

For more on the 1936 constitution and how it exemplified this kind of formal freedom, see:
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buy housing but that permission is generally upheld and respected.6 Nevertheless,
some face obstacles to buying housing such that they cannot buy housing despite
their permission to do so, most obviously those who lack the money necessary – or
even the means to acquire the money necessary – to purchase it.7 Notwithstanding
the state’s permission, an American does not necessarily have the means or
capacities to actualize the objective of having housing. Furthermore, despite the
permission, an American may not have any autonomy in choosing their housing,
such as when discriminatory housing arrangements segregate them to specific
housing facilities or neighborhoods, nor any say in choosing the exchange and
property rights system that governs the rules of acquiring housing in the first
instance.8 The freedom to buy housing in the U.S., then, is still only a legal
permission that many cannot realize. Consequently, we can translate the statement
as follows:
You have only the formal freedom [in the sense of having actual legal
permission] to buy housing.
Thus, ‘formal freedom’ may refer to either merely nominal or actual legal
permission. This non-univocal construal of formal freedom captures the different
usages of the term while at the same time accounting for the procedural, superficial
character implied by the word ‘formal’ in all cases the distinction is invoked. It also

Importantly, legal permission to ‘buy housing’ of some sort is generally upheld and
respected only in those very non-specific terms. The U.S. has a long, continuing history of housing
discrimination. See: Rothstein.
7 Amartya Sen invokes the formal-substantive freedom distinction in explicating his account
of rights, listing poverty as a “major source” of substantive unfreedom (Development, 3).
8 These obstacles reflect the properties of exercisability I discuss in 2.2.
6
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clarifies the criticism implied by the term ‘merely formal freedom’: an agent who, in
some sense, cannot Φ may nevertheless have legal permission of the nominal or
actual kind to Φ, meaning neither type of permission gives rise to conditions where
A can Φ on their own. As Matthew Kramer states, “Permissibility and impossibility
can coincide” (63).9
2.2 Substantive Freedom and Exercisability
In contrast, we are described as substantively free when some form of legal
permission is instantiated in conjunction with exercisability: the capacity to do what
we are legally permitted to do. In other words, substantive freedom is exercisable
formal freedom. Like formal freedom, ‘substantive freedom’ is non-univocal. Here, I
argue that this is a consequence of exercisability itself being a non-univocal term
comprising a cluster of three possible exercisability criteria: ability, opportunity,
and self-direction.
Differences in the usage of substantive freedom are based on which set of
exercisability criteria a speaker takes to be necessary or sufficient for adequate
exercisability to obtain and the degree to which one feels those criteria must obtain.
Here, I do not argue for conceiving exercisability as any set of criteria over another;
as I will argue later, each meaning captures an important philosophical

Kramer disagrees with the contention that legal permission is a necessary condition for
‘can.’ He argues an act can be illegal and possible simultaneously, even if the legal permissions are
enforced, since “enforcement is usually post hoc” (63). Strictly speaking, this is true: we do not have
legal permission to shoplift, yet many do. But lacking legal permission poses obstacles to actions
even if they are ‘possible.’ For instance, the psychological threat of punishment prevents many from
taking something from a store without paying; this obstacle keeps shoplifting to a minimum relative
to the number of those who might like to steal.
9
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disagreement. Rather, I will explain each criterion’s relation to the exercisability of
legal permissions and, thus, substantive freedom.
2.2.1 Ability and Opportunity
The first two criteria, ability and opportunity, are similar and often
interrelated, but not identical. Indeed, as Matthew Dowding points out,10 much of
the literature on freedom conflates ability and opportunity into a single category of
‘ability,’11 – as in the expression “freedom-as-ability” – but these are, in fact, distinct
properties (Dowding, “Capabilities” 324-325). Dowding defines ability as “what one
could do if the right circumstances obtain” (324). Opportunity, on the other hand,
describes the obtaining of ‘the right circumstances’; that is, opportunity obtains “if
the means that are needed to perform [some] action are available to” an agent
(Dowding and van Hees 6).
It is important to distinguish between ability and opportunity because some
may regard one property as politically relevant but not the other. For a simple
illustration of the difference, Dowding offers the example of a proficient darts player
whose skills are such that she hits the bulls-eye 90% of the time. Even if trapped on
an island with no darts or boards, the player has the ability to hit the bulls-eye,
even though she lacks the opportunity to hit a bulls-eye because, in the

Dowding, who draws from Peter Morriss’s work on power, makes a compelling case that
the property often referred to as “ability” in political philosophy is actually “ableness”: the
combination of ability and opportunity (“Capabilities” 324). See also: Dowding and Van Hees 5-7;
Dowding, Power; Morriss. Ableness is arguably the primary concern in Sen’s usage of ‘substantive
freedom.’ See: Sen, Development 4-5, 8, 18-19.
11 For example, Carter uses the term “ability” as an all-encompassing description of “the
absence of material constraints of all kinds” (492-493) – a definition which Dowding would consider
semantically dubious.
10
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circumstances, she lacks the resources (darts and boards) to do so (Dowding 324).12
Ergo, an agent may have the ability to Φ but not the opportunity to Φ, or vice versa.
Nevertheless, both of these properties are connected to the exercisability of our legal
permissions: where one has the ability or opportunity necessary to Φ, the capacity
to exercise their legal permission to Φ is increased.
First, ability refers to what one is able to do through their personal capacities
given the proper circumstances. For the ability to Φ to obtain, an agent must have,
among other things, the skills and socioeconomic resources needed to exercise the
legal permission to Φ; for example, one must have the necessary education, welfare,
healthcare, and so on. To illustrate, imagine a society where a person, Simon, has
legal permission to read political literature. Simon also has access to books and
newspapers through a local library, meaning the proper circumstances exist for him
to read political literature. Nevertheless, Simon does not have the ability to read
because, in his society, people do not have a right to a basic education where they
are taught to read. One could argue in favor of such a right because it will make
Simon’s formal freedom to read political literature in this sense exercisable and,
hence, substantive.
Second, opportunity describes the circumstances an agent needs to exercise a
legal permission, which has practical implications for entitlements to material
resources necessary for those circumstances to arise. To demonstrate, imagine Kim
lives in a country that constitutionally guarantees her freedom of movement.

Dowding and Van Hees offer a more thorough illustration of the distinction with the
example of a piano player’s ability to play the piano versus opportunity to do so (5-8).
12
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However, Kim’s town is located in an area where landslides are common, frequently
obstructing her capacity to transport to those places she wishes to go. The issue
could be solved by constructing retaining walls or some other infrastructural
improvement, but neither Kim’s government, nor the private sector, has shown any
interest in allocating resources to address the issue. Kim has the formal freedom to
travel in and out of her town, but she often cannot exercise her legal permission due
to environmental obstacles and a lack of the material means to overcome them.13
Here, one might argue in favor of proposals that give rise to the circumstances
necessary for Kim to exercise her legal permission to travel, transforming her
formal freedom into substantive freedom.
2.2.2 Self-direction
The third criterion of exercisability is self-direction. Self-direction broadly
refers to the capacity of agents to direct their own will: if I cannot direct my own
will, then I cannot act freely.14 Self-direction is a social, relational property that is
constrained by agential obstacles.15 In order for an agent to possess self-direction, at

As G.A. Cohen notes (“Structure”), Harry Frankfurt expounds upon how human
intervention and environmental intervention are effectively the same in that they hinder an agent’s
action (Frankfurt 44-45). Nevertheless, some argue that allegedly natural, circumstantial obstacles
are, in fact, agential or structural, particularly in contemporary capitalist society. To a large extent,
this seems true. For instance, it is a virtual truism that world hunger is not due to a scarcity of food
but rather the consequence of our socio-economic and political systems, a truism borne out by the
evidence (see: Lappé; Lappé, et al.; Holt-Giménez, et al.). Still, it seems difficult to deny that some
factors not generated by the choices of human agents can and do constitute obstacles to our actions.
For many, those factors cannot be simply dismissed as politically irrelevant.
14 This property (or something like it) is also referred to as, inter alia, autonomy,
independence, self-determination, or self-governance. My points here primarily draw from Kantian
and Rousseauian conceptions of true freedom. For more, see: Ripstein, Force 14-16; Forst 536;
Neuhouser 365, 392; Fatić 66. A similar notion of substantive freedom can also be found in African
philosophical traditions; see: Ikuenobe 1020.
15 Self-direction can also be infringed upon, though, by collectively choosing to enact social
conditions that are inconsistent with it. Ergo, some argue the right to take part in making laws also
13
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least two conditions must be present.
First, for one to have self-direction, their choices cannot be controlled. As
Rafeeq Hasan argues, to make choices autonomously, an agent’s choices can neither
be subject to “the direct control of the choice-making capacities of another” nor
“asymmetrical influence in a power relationship” (Hasan 914). This means selfdirection requires that our choice-making capacities are free from coercion: we must
be in a position to govern our own wills.
Second, since one’s will may come into conflict with the will of others, the
upholding of one’s capacity to direct their own will necessitates institutions and
norms that protect each agent’s capacity to do so. For me to direct my own will,
others’ wills cannot infringe upon my direction. Likewise, for others to direct their
wills, my will cannot infringe upon theirs. Such an arrangement can only be
actualized through institutional and normative forces that can ensure the equal
autonomy of all agents within a society. Moreover, following the classic Rousseauian
arguments, a right to the governance of one’s self within a society entails a right to
participation in governance generally (Neuhouser 365, 391-392).
We can test the tenability of the proposition that self-direction can be
construed as a criterion of exercisability by considering the consequences of a lack of
self-direction. A person lacking the right to self-direction might face obstacles that
obstruct her capacity to influence or participate in the construction of her society’s

requires a right to the entitlements and material resources necessary to take part in the making of
laws effectively, and so there is arguably significant overlap between the conditions for ability or
opportunity and self-direction. See: Srinivasan 467-471; Bohman 321-346.
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rights (and, thus, her own rights), despite possessing formal freedom – of the
nominal legal permission kind – to engage in the political system. Such a lack of
self-direction is exemplified in the ‘white primary’ cases of the late 19th to early 20th
centuries, where Black citizens in the Southern United States were formally free to
vote but forbidden by state Democratic Party leaders to participate in the primaries.
Since winning the Democratic primary essentially ensured a candidate’s victory in
the “one-party South,” this meant that Black voters effectively had no voting power
(Klarman). In such scenarios, it can be said that an agent’s formal freedoms lack
exercisability: she cannot exercise choices outside of those that have been externally
arranged for her without her consent or participation.
2.3 Summary
Again, the concept of substantive freedom gets deployed in various ways in
political discourse. Given the various forms of exercisability, it is unsurprising that
we find this variance across discursive contexts. Any one person might view just one
criterion as the most politically salient exercisability property and, thusly, the
property that best characterizes substantive freedom.16 Conversely, others might
view all three properties as necessary conditions for exercisability.17

For example, one might argue that self-direction is the true determinant of substantive
freedom, and that the state has no duty to assure opportunity and ability. Likewise, one might argue
the opposite.
17 Karl Marx, for example, seemed to affirm the radical notion that “true freedom” requires
all three of these properties to the greatest degree possible – a sort of exercisability maximalism view
of substantive freedom. Marx speaks of a conflict between “physical need” and “necessity” versus “the
true realm of freedom” for human beings; maximal self-direction, ability, and opportunity would
seem to be the only means to the complete abolition of the sort of freedom-constraining “necessity”
Marx is referring to (Capital 1340; Manuscripts 76, 84). Put differently, for Marx, an agent’s true
freedom to Φ obtains – that is, humans enter the realm of true freedom – iff all exercisability criteria
16
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The crucial point is that formal freedom and substantive freedom,
approximately conceived as I have outlined, are distinct: formal freedom consists of
legal permissions that are not exercisable, while substantive freedom is exercisable
legal permission.
3

THE USEFULNESS OF THE DISTINCTION

Having explicated the formal-substantive freedom distinction, I now aim to
prove the distinction’s usefulness in this section. I begin by arguing that the
distinction is useful in understanding philosophical disagreements about political
proposals involving freedom. Then, I posit that, in the practical realm, the
distinction provides a helpful conceptual framework for describing the actual scope
of freedom enacted by political proposals and institutions as well as formulating
demands for greater freedom.
3.1 Philosophical Significance
The formal-substantive freedom distinction is philosophically useful in that
its concepts can help clarify disagreements concerning proposals that purportedly
provide or protect ‘freedom’ as such, but in practice, uphold only formal freedom for
some set of agents. This is important since different philosophical views include
disagreements about the necessary or sufficient conditions for political freedom. For
any particular proposal, some hold that mere legal permission (or formal freedom)
to Φ is insufficient to merit the designation ‘freedom’ in at least some
circumstances, while others hold that legal permission is sufficient for considering

obtain and to the greatest extent possible. See also: Arnold 6.b. For a somewhat similar view to
Marx’s, see: Van Parijs 22-23.
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one politically free to Φ even if that permission is not accompanied by exercisability
for some. Hence, the distinction clarifies the divide between those advocating
different kinds of rights and their differing evaluations of how ‘free’ a proposal
renders its subjects.
Take healthcare as an example. Some philosophers hold that merely granting
legal permission – formal freedom – for all citizens to acquire healthcare is not
sufficient to classify all citizens as ‘free’ to acquire healthcare. This is because some
economically-disadvantaged people will not be substantively free to acquire
healthcare: they cannot exercise their legal permission to do so since they cannot
afford (private) healthcare. Accordingly, some advocate enacting a right to
healthcare. Amartya Sen, for example, advocates publicly-funded universal
healthcare, arguing that lacking an exercisable right to healthcare constitutes an
“unfreedom;” Sen even considers a lack of healthcare an obstacle to the “freedom to
survive” (Development, 4, 15, 41-49; “Universal”). In general, most egalitarians and
socialists will agree with Sen that the law in question does not deliver substantive
freedom, though their reasoning and motivations vary. Some Rawlsian egalitarians
argue that one must be substantively free to access healthcare, either as a primary
social good or as a precondition for freely engaging in the primary political liberties
of a just society (Ekmekci and Arda 232-235). Alternatively, as Pablo Gilabert
demonstrates, socialists within the Marxian tradition argue that guaranteeing the
substantive freedom to acquire healthcare and satisfy one’s health needs is a critical
component of fulfilling the distributive principle of “from each according to their
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abilities, to each according to their needs” (Gilabert 209). But while their particular
motivations vary, all of these views coalesce around the position that mere legal
permission cannot be said to make at least a portion of the population ‘free,’ as it
does not provide substantive freedom for all.
Conversely, others hold that the formal freedom to acquire healthcare is a
foundational right but reject the notion that the state should be involved in making
that formal freedom exercisable for all. Particularly, laissez-faire liberals18 will
oppose this further step of using the power of government to provide the substantive
freedom to acquire healthcare. For instance, Robert Nozick argues that the
“distributional facts” of medical services, no matter how unequal, do not justify
state intervention with the holdings of agents in order to provide adequate
healthcare to everyone so long as the “processes yielding these [distributional facts
are] legitimate” (233-235). In other words, the government cannot justifiably
interfere with the property or finances of others – through taxation, for example – to
implement the substantive freedom to acquire healthcare for the poor. This is not to
say that laissez-faire liberals categorically oppose the substantive freedom to
acquire healthcare for anyone (or even everyone), but rather that they oppose
ratifying that substantive freedom as a political right. However, on the laissez-faire
liberal view, this does not render any individuals politically ‘unfree’ to acquire
healthcare. A laissez-faire liberal might argue that the redistribution of resources is
outside the proper scope of state authority or responsibility, and thusly, the fact

In using the term ‘laissez-faire liberals,’ I follow Carter, who uses the term to encompass
“classical liberals or libertarians” (486).
18
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that some agents lack substantive freedom to acquire healthcare is simply not a
political problem, meaning the formal freedom enshrined by the healthcare law is
sufficient for considering all its citizens politically ‘free’ to acquire healthcare.
The dispute between laissez-faire liberals and egalitarians or socialists
regarding healthcare hinges on a more fundamental disagreement over whether the
right to political freedom as such includes substantive freedom.19 It is not my
objective to resolve this disagreement over rights to substantive freedom in this
paper, but merely to show it is a real and important disagreement.
Furthermore, the disagreement is not necessarily a simple consequence of
differences between those who uphold negative liberty theories and those who
uphold positive liberty theories.20 Isaiah Berlin famously defines negative liberty as
“the area within which a man [sic] can act unobstructed by others” (Berlin 169) and
positive liberty as “freedom which consists in being one's own master” (178). The
former is typically associated with the laissez-faire liberal tradition, while the latter
is typically associated with the egalitarian and socialist traditions. However, there
are exceptions to this rule. For instance, the socialist philosopher G.A. Cohen
outlines a negative liberty view which nevertheless accommodates rights to
substantive freedom, since Cohen considers the obstacles to action posed by private

There are also a variety of different theories of freedom informing the differences here,
namely republican freedom (Pettit), positive freedom (or capabilities freedom) views (Sen,
Development), and hybrids of the two (Gilabert), versus negative liberty views (Nozick).
Nevertheless, I maintain that the formal-substantive freedom distinction cannot be neatly reduced to
a difference between positive and negative liberty.
20 Berlin famously defines negative liberty as “the area within which a man [sic] can act
unobstructed
by others” (Berlin 169) and positive liberty as “freedom which consists in being one's own
master” (178).
19
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property owners at least on par with those posed by governments, and thusly, holds
that government interference is necessary to minimize interferences overall (Cohen,
On the Currency 166-193).21
I will further discuss the formal-substantive freedom distinction’s larger
philosophical relevance in section 3.
3.2 Practical Significance
The formal-substantive freedom distinction also has practical significance. It
can be particularly helpful for explaining and justifying the demands of
marginalized and oppressed social groups within political discourse. From the
perspective of people who cannot exercise their legal permission to Φ, the worth of
their formal freedom may seem questionable,22 motivating a desire for increased
exercisability. The distinction enables disempowered groups to describe why they
are not satisfied with their ‘freedom’: since they cannot exercise their formal
freedom, they seek political measures that will make them ‘free’ in the substantive
sense.
To demonstrate, imagine a nation-state that takes itself to be a free society
enacting legal permission for all adults to run for political office, but in practice,
allowing significant obstacles to most people exercising that permission. People who
do not meet certain criteria – such as specific income levels, formal education

For more on Cohen’s view of freedom, see: Cohen, “Structure.”
John Rawls reaches a similar conclusion but argues that inequalities in the worth of
liberty are justified so long as they are “compensated” by meeting the Rawlsian difference principle
(179). Of course, whether this argument is correct remains debatable, and even more debatable is the
proposition that modern liberal capitalist societies meet (or even can meet) the difference principle.
For an argument that proper Rawlsian reasoning leads to anti-capitalist conclusions, see:
Edmundson.
21
22
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backgrounds, attractiveness to the society’s elite class, and so on – are effectively
excluded from running. Suppose someone wishing to run for office petitions to
rectify this problem, pointing out that many citizens face insurmountable obstacles
to acting as representatives in their government. However, the politician who holds
the seat which the would-be candidate wishes to challenge writes a newspaper oped rebutting this assertion. The politician insists that there is no real injustice
against the would-be candidate: they are ‘free’ to run for office since it is perfectly
legal for them to do so. Imagine the would-be candidate writes a response arguing
that while they may be formally free to run, they are not really free to do so.23 Here,
the distinction not only has descriptive power, but also helps show that the
politician’s ascription of ‘freedom’ simpliciter to those who are only formally free
could be considered deceptive since the politician’s conception of ‘freedom’ in this
instance involves only formal freedom.
This scenario illustrates the utility of the formal-substantive freedom
distinction in drawing attention to the potential hollowness of merely formal
freedom and articulating arguments for greater freedom, particularly for
disempowered people.
4

CARTER’S ARGUMENT AND TWO OBJECTIONS

I will now review Carter’s arguments against the formal-substantive freedom
distinction. Though Carter’s interpretation of the distinction differs from my own, I

This is relevant to current discussions about the merits of public financing of elections.
See: Miller.
23
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will extract some objections from his arguments that could be potentially be leveled
at my account and offer my replies.24
4.1 Carter’s Argument
Against those who assert that laissez-faire liberals are “exclusively concerned
with formal freedom” (Carter 488), Carter suggests that the formal-substantive
freedom distinction is conceptually deficient and fails to clarify philosophical
differences between laissez-faire liberals and egalitarians or socialists.
Carter posits three possible interpretations of ‘formal freedom’:
a. The formal freedom for some agent A to do x obtains when “A
is legally permitted to do x and others are legally prohibited from
preventing A from doing x; by contrast, A is substantively free to do x—
is ‘really’ free to do x—only if, in addition to having this normative
freedom, A is materially able to do x.” (488)
b. “[F]ormal freedom consists in the presence of legal claimrights not to be prevented from exercising certain liberty-rights, plus
the fact that those legal claim-rights are actually respected[…] One is
substantively free, on the other hand, to the extent that one possesses
the material means to exercise one’s legal liberty-rights.” (489)
c. “[F]ormal freedom consists in the legal recognition of all
morally just claim-rights not to be prevented from exercising morally
just liberty-rights, plus the fact that those morally just claim-rights are
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actually respected,” while substantive freedom is the same, plus the
material conditions necessary to actually exercise those morally just
claim-rights (490-492).
Carter argues that all three of these conceptions fail.
If we presuppose that laissez-faire liberals are “exclusively concerned” with
formal freedom, Carter argues, then a. and b. lead us to absurd conclusions about
the kinds of social arrangements laissez-faire liberals would support. a. forces us to
conclude that laissez-faire liberals would describe a society as “free” where A is
legally permitted to perform x even if agents “physically prevent” the performance
of x (illegally) (488-489). On b., we would have to conclude that people are “formally
free” even if they live in a society that legalizes shooting one’s neighbors for no
reason, so long as this law is respected, even if the consequence is that “almost no
one is able to leave their home” without being shot (489). In both cases, even the
most committed laissez-faire liberal would not deny that the effected agents have
become unfree. Hence, Carter concludes that both a. and b. are incorrect.
Conversely, if we accept c., then Carter holds that the formal-substantive
freedom distinction risks incoherence. He notes that, on an egalitarian or socialist
understanding of justice, a morally just freedom “requires substantive freedom” to
be morally just in the first place. The upshot is that “[i]f formal freedom is justicebased freedom, and justice requires substantive freedom for all, then formal
freedom qualifies as substantive freedom,” meaning “the contrast between formal
and substantive freedom appears to have broken down” (491).
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From these issues, Carter infers that those who refer to the formalsubstantive freedom distinction are guilty of “conceptual slippage” with other, “more
coherent distinctions” we find in the discourse on freedom (487, 494). Specifically,
on a. – which Carter seems to find the most plausible – egalitarians and socialists
are referring to the simple distinction between “interpersonal or social freedom” (as
formal freedom) and “freedom-as-ability” (as substantive freedom). b. and c. further
confuse matters by conflating formal freedom with either legally or morally
normative conceptions of freedom, respectively, while maintaining that substantive
freedom is equivalent to “freedom-as-ability” (492-494). Carter concludes that the
formal-substantive freedom distinction is lacks clarity and fails to illuminate
anything about the divide between laissez-faire liberalism and egalitarian or
socialism: “[w]hichever of the three interpretations one endorses, it is incorrect to
characterize the laissez-faire liberal’s refusal to identify freedom with ability as
depending on an exclusive attachment to something called ‘formal freedom’” (495).
My non-univocal explanation of the formal-substantive freedom distinction
and its significance substantially differs from Carter’s three (univocal)
interpretations. Nevertheless, for the remainder of this section, I will extract from
his core arguments two possible objections that could be leveled at my own account
and offer my responses.
4.2 The Relevance-to-Laissez-Faire Liberalism Objection
I have already contended in 2.1 that the formal-substantive freedom
distinction has philosophical relevance, not only for evaluating particular political
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proposals, but also for evaluating political philosophies holistically. It helps to
describe and clarify points of philosophical disagreement concerning what political
freedom entails, as well as what rights to substantive freedom, if any, citizens ought
to have.
In contrast, Carter’s primary claim is that while the distinction often gets
invoked in criticisms of laissez-faire liberalism, it is not relevant to the “ideological
divide between” that political philosophy and egalitarianism or socialism (487, 489,
495). Much of Carter’s argument against the distinction’s relevance in this respect
rests on the presupposition that those who invoke the distinction also accept the
exclusivity thesis: the proposition that formal freedom is the “exclusive” kind of
freedom endorsed by laissez-faire liberals. Indeed, if we hold that the exclusivity
thesis is true,25 Carter is correct that the formal-substantive freedom distinction
implies some absurd conclusions, even on my own conception. However, if we reject
the exclusivity thesis – as I think we should – and instead affirm that laissez-faire
liberals primarily endorse the governmental provision of rights to formal freedom
rather than substantive freedom, then my conception not only dodges his objection,
but helps demonstrate why the language of formal freedom and substantive
freedom can help clarify philosophical disagreements.
Hence, I suggest that the distinction does help us to understand a key
difference between laissez-faire liberalism and egalitarians or socialists: due to its

Notably, though Carter states “it has been common” for egalitarians and socialists to
accuse laissez-faire liberals of having an “exclusive concern with ‘formal’ freedom,” he does not cite a
source wherein such an “exclusive concern” is alleged (486).
25
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other philosophical commitments, laissez-faire liberalism tends to oppose rights to
substantive freedom. More specifically, most forms of laissez-faire liberalism
endorse a state-centered non-interference theory of freedom. I am defining statecentered non-interference theories as those which hold that the primary gauge of
political freedom is the absence of interference by the government rather than the
absence of interference of all sorts. This idea is firmly located within the laissezfaire liberal tradition.26 As Phillip Pettit notes, the contention that the state as such
merits central focus as a threat to liberty has a long tradition in classical liberal
philosophy. Pettit specifically quotes Maurice Cranston and Anthony Arblaster as
claiming state non-interference per se is the very definition of freedom on liberalism,
while showing Hobbes and Bentham hold only slightly-less radically state-centered
views (167-168).27 This prima facie opposition to government interference with
political, social, and economic inequalities effectively translates into proposals that
generate merely formal freedom for many.28 For instance, in-principle opposition to
government interference may mean opposing the criminalization of abortion, but
also opposing redistributive economic proposals that ensure women seeking an
abortion can afford abortion services. When actualized, the effect of such an
approach is that poor women have the formal freedom to have an abortion – for they
have legal permission to do so – but not the substantive freedom to do so – because

Of course, not all liberals would claim this view. For example, see: Kramer 71n69.
Pettit draws his points about Hobbes and Bentham from Isaiah Berlin; see: Berlin 170n3.
For more examples of the connection between ‘laissez-faire liberalism’ and state-centered noninterference theories in the literature, see: Ripstein, “Beyond” 36-37; Law 163.
28As Jonathan Weinberg puts it, “That a regime of formal freedom and equal rights may in
fact be unfree and unequal because of gross preexisting inequality in economic or other power is not
a new argument[…] It was at the heart of our rejection of Lochner” (1164). Quoted also in: Persad.
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they cannot exercise that permission. We can imagine many similar examples.
In other words, for those who hold to a state-centered non-interference theory
of freedom, universal guarantees of substantive freedom are typically out of the
question since they tend to entail state interference. This raises particularly
difficult challenges for laissez-faire liberals who claim that their chief aim is the
maximization of freedom: if their proposals maximize formal freedom but also
generate deficits in substantive freedom, the notion that they are maximizing
‘freedom’ simpliciter may be vulnerable to critique.
There are a few possible replies to this. As I mentioned in 2.1, one may
altogether deny that substantive freedom is necessary for political freedom to
obtain, but this presupposes that exercisability is not politically-relevant, which still
requires justification (just as the opposite position requires justification).
Conversely, one might accept that substantive freedom is necessary for political
freedom, but argue laissez-faire liberalism does a better job of expanding
substantive freedom for most people than egalitarian or socialist policies – perhaps
due to the gains in wealth attributed to unencumbered market economies – despite
its rejection of upholding substantive freedom as a right. However, this position
opens the door to complex empirical and theoretical questions that are not easily
answered.29

Regarding ‘theoretical questions,’ it is not clear that any property regime that includes
holdings of any kind – including laissez-faire market economies – can be said to provide more
freedoms than unfreedoms. Numerically speaking, on a strict non-interference view, creating a
single bit of personal property – say, a doodle on a single sheet of paper – generates billions of
unfreedoms: unfreedoms for everyone other than the creator to have the drawing as their property.
This is not to say that absolute opposition to personal property rights is a defensible position, but the
example demonstrates the extreme conceptual difficulties of calculating the balance of freedoms and
29
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It is not my intention to defend either side of these disagreements here.
Instead, the very existence of the disagreements strengthens my principal point: the
formal-substantive freedom distinction highlights key differences between
ideologies, particularly between laissez-faire liberalism and egalitarianism or
socialism, as well as between the different conceptions of freedom on which these
views tend to rely (as discussed in 2.1). The distinction aids our discourse by
pointing toward a real philosophical difference about the necessary conditions for
political freedom. While laissez-faire liberals should not be generically labeled as
“exclusive concerned” with formal freedom, it is also true that our different
approaches to formal and substantive freedom are an essential ideological
divergence point, and to hold that the distinction ultimately amounts to incoherence
or mislabeling appears to be an attempt to simply dodge the more demanding task
of justifying one’s position vis-à-vis whether mere legal permission is sufficient for
political freedom to obtain.
4.3 The Semantic Objection
Speaking generally, Carter’s arguments imply that, while the properties to
which the terms ‘substantive freedom’ and ‘formal freedom’ refer may be distinct,
they should not be called ‘formal freedom’ and ‘substantive freedom.’ Rather, Carter
holds that the most plausible conception of formal freedom and substantive freedom
are basically different terms for two different conceptions of political freedom, with
‘formal freedom’ referring to social or interpersonal conceptions of freedom and

unfreedoms generated by an institution like the market. (My argument here is inspired by Cohen.
See: Cohen, On the Currency 147-165.)
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‘substantive freedom’ referring to “freedom-as-ability” (or freedom as “the power to
act”). On Carter’s view, rather than use the terms ‘formal freedom’ and ‘substantive
freedom,’ it would be more accurate to simply speak of the distinction between
‘interpersonal freedom’ and ‘freedom-as-ability’ (492, 494-495).
However, if we conceive of formal freedom and substantive freedom as I have
outlined, Carter’s objection does not hold: an argument for substantive freedom
need not be based in an argument for ‘freedom-as-ability.’ As discussed in 1.2.2, selfdirection, an interpersonal property, is a part of exercisability alongside ability and
opportunity. One may advocate for ‘substantive freedom’ by endorsing proposals
that will expand self-direction for citizens while adhering to a strict interpersonal
conception of freedom without contradiction.
While it is true that substantive freedom can also be deployed in a sense that
will most appeal to those holding to a ‘freedom-as-ability’ conception, substantive
freedom, as a non-univocal term, does not necessarily presuppose that conception.
Hence, the term ‘substantive freedom’ cannot be universally replaced with ‘freedomas-ability.’
5

CONCLUSION

I have argued that the formal-substantive freedom distinction is a coherent,
meaningful distinction. In addition, the distinction is useful in clarifying
disagreements concerning proposals that ostensibly provide broad rights to freedom
that are, in fact, limited in their exercisability. I have shown that these issues have
practical and ideological significance. I have also shown that the terminological
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implications of ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ freedom are fair and accurate descriptions
of the concepts to which the terms refer. Finally, I have shown that the formalsubstantive freedom distinction is neutral on the question of freedom’s normative
status.
The stakes of this dispute extend beyond the walls of academia.
Distinguishing merely formal freedom from real, substantive freedom has import
not only for philosophy but also for popular movements that seek to draw attention
to subtler forms of oppression and unfreedom than the overt criminalization of
actions. Dismissing the distinction as a ‘myth’ is potentially damaging to those
movements that refer to it in their demands for social justice. This should further
motivate us to reject attempts to shelve the formal-substantive freedom distinction,
especially since – as this paper has argued – allegations that it faces coherence and
usefulness problems do not pass scrutiny.
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